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studies drawn from the writer's experience are used to illustrate this approach.

Keywords
Mediators (Persons)--Professional ethics

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.

This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol40/iss1/2

MEDIATING ETHICALLY: THE
LIMITS OF CODES OF CONDUCT AND
THE POTENTIAL OF A REFLECTIVE
PRACTICE MODEL©
BY JULIE MACFARLANE*

Discussions regarding the appropriate ethical
behaviours for mediators and the subsequent
development of formal codes of conduct have focused on
hallmark issues such as third party impartiality and party
self-determination. However, in an informal process,
ethical choices are inherent in every intervention made by
a mediator. In adopting the standard-setting approach of
an adjudicative model, mediator codes of conduct are a
poor fit with the conceptual and structural characteristics
of this fluid, uncertain, and essentially private process.
Confining the substantive and conceptual debate over
mediation ethics to formal codes dangerously
underestimates both the scope and the significance of
choices faced constantly by intervenors in their process
management role. A disclosing and questioning dialogue
among mediators and others, using Sch6nian principles of
reflective practice, is proposed as a more candid and
complete recognition of the ethical dilemmas that arise in
mediation. Two real-life case studies drawn from the
writer's experience are used to illustrate this approach.

Les discussions relatives aux comportements
appropri6s et .thiques pour m~diateurs, ainsi que le
dsveloppement subsequent de codes d~ontologiques, ont
surtout port6 sur des sujets tel que l'impartialit6 des tiers
et le droit des parties A I'autod6termination. Toutefois,
au sein d'un processus informel, les choix 6thiques font
partie inh6rente de chaque intervention faite par le
m~diateur. En adoptant rapproche du mod/le adjudicatif
inspir6 de l'laboration de standards, les codes de
d6ontologie destin6s aux m6diateurs sont mal adapt6s aux
caract.ristiques conceptuelles et structurales d'un
processus priv6 qui est ii la fois fluide et incertain. En
limitant le d~bat substantiel et conceptuel des questions
6thiques rencontr&es en mediation aux codes formalistes,
on peut dangereusement sous-estimer la portde et
l'importance des choix devant lesquels les intervenants
font face en tant que dirigeants d'un processus. En
s'inspirant des principes de Sch6n sur la pratique r~fl~chie
- qui reconnaissent de fagon int6grale et franche les
dilemmes moraux qui surgissent lors d'une m~diation l'auteure propose un dialogue ouvert et inquisitoire qui
peut figurer parmi les mddiateurs et autresjoueurs. Deux
cas puis~s de rexp~rience de rauteure servent Aillustrer
cette approche.
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INFORMALITY AND DISCRETION IN MEDIATION

For disputants and mediators alike, one of the most attractive
characteristics of the mediation process is its informality and almost infinite
flexibility to accommodate different needs and interests. Conversely, a
number of writers, particularly those concerned with the protection of
vulnerable parties, emphasize the dangers associated with an absence of
regulated procedural equality.1 The freedom to fashion tailor-made
processes and outcomes in private, unobserved proceedings also means that
there is potential for exploitation by parties with greater expertise,
resources, and social power. It is the mediator who assumes the primary
responsibility for ensuring the realization of mediation's benefits without
creating or perpetuating unfairness. The mediator's ethical sensibilities and
judgments are critical to this process.' In this article, I shall argue that
minimizing the dangers of private negotiated settlement and providing fair,
non-coercive structures for settlement discussion require the self-conscious
development of a strong, reflexive, and transparent culture of ethics in
mediation. The current approach-largely limited to the development of

I See e.g. R. Delgado et al., "Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in
Alternative Dispute Resolution" [1985] Wis. L. Rev. 1359 at 1387-89; P.E. Bryan, "Killing Us Softly:
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power" (1992) 40 Buff. L. Rev. 441; and L.G. Lerman,
"Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women"
(1984) 7 Harv. Women's L.J. 57. See generally R.L. Abel, ed., The Politics of InformalJustice:The
American Experience, vol. 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1982).
2 Michael Coyle has written that "the mediator is a moral agent involved in the process." See M.
Coyle, "Defending the Weak and Fighting Unfairness: Can Mediators Respond to the Challenge?"
(1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625 at 640.
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voluntary codes of conduct for mediators-consistently underestimates and
oversimplifies the complexities of what it means to mediate ethically.
Ethical professional behaviours and actions are uniquely
problematic in the context of mediation. The special nature of the ethical
dilemmas which confront mediators becomes clear when one compares the
mediator's role with other third party roles in dispute resolution. The
discretion exercised by the third party in dealing with the many novel and
morally complex issues that arise before, during, and after mediation
critically shapes the mediation process. In addition, the discretion exercised
by a mediator differs from that of an adjudicator. External standards guide
and constrain an adjudicator. Unlike an adjudicator, the mediator is
constrained by neither procedural rules governing process, nor substantive
rules determining outcome. In the absence of formal rules from procedure
or the evaluation of arguments which allow the parties to function more or
less independently of the third party so long as they abide by the rules, the
mediator must pay attention to every aspect of party interaction in the
course of their negotiations, and assumes a very broad responsibility for the
management process that unfolds. The mediator's process management
role may include structuring, focusing and balancing the discussion, and
facilitating the design of any agreed procedures. The known end point of
adjudication-the judge's decision-gives shape and direction to the
actions and decisions of the third party. By contrast, the end point of a
mediation session is unknown. The process may, or may not, achieve an
agreed outcome. In their oversight of both process and dialogue, mediators
make whatever choices they believe will advance the internal goals of the
process. Every time mediators intervene in the dialogue between the
parties, they must choose from among the numerous ways of exercising
their third-party role. For example, they may be directive, suggestive, or
simply facilitative. They may be supportive or attempt to discourage
particular proposals. They may move the parties into private caucus, or
keep them together in joint session. They may adopt a probing or crossexamination style of questioning, or they may simply summarize the
information provided by each party. These choices over type and level of
intervention reflect the practitioner's conception of the values and goals of
the mediation process itself.
At a general level, mediators appear to share some common goals
which allow mediation to be presented as a distinctive process choice
despite a wide range of practice styles. These goals include enabling each
party to contribute their perspective to the dialogue, explaining and
clarifying the sources of the conflict, encouraging collaborative problem
solving by the parties, and developing mutually acceptable outcomes. These
goals may be collectively summarized as enhancing constructive
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communication. Other goals which are often treated as universally accepted
and tend to find their way into the codes of conduct developed for conflict
resolution practitioners include mediator impartiality, mediator expertise,
and process and outcome fairness.' However, since notions of impartiality
and expertise are inevitably culturally specific, they may not be universally
embraced by mediators.4 The belief that mediators are responsible for
ensuring fair outcomes is also highly contentious. Historically, the greatest
support for this position has been among family mediators, but it is by no
means universally accepted.5 Nonetheless, impartiality, expertise, and
fairness have great appeal as common or universal goals for mediation
because they suggest standards external to the process which enable
mediators to anticipate ethical dilemmas and identify the right course of
action, regardless of the context in which the dilemma arises. The problem
is not only that these goals are less than universally accepted by mediators,
but that their external character obscures the nature of ethical choices in
mediation. In this article, I shall argue that mediating ethically requires the
constant generation of internal norms appropriate for a specific mediation
and set of parties. The goal of facilitating constructive communication,
where the norms and practices for a case must be generated from the actual
interaction between the parties and the mediator, fits more naturally within
this model.
Even if the facilitation of constructive communication can be
regarded as a universal objective for mediation processes, there is
significant diversity in how individual mediators choose to advance this
goal. These choices reflect different philosophical, strategic, and stylistic
convictions.6 As a result, the character of any one mediation process is
highly dependent upon the exercise of discretion by the mediator. This is

3

For an example of a list of functional goals for mediators, see ibid.
at 632-36.
4 Moreover, the constant repetition of these values in codes of conduct for mediators highlights
the dangerous potential of codes to entrench an unquestioned culturally dominant perspective.
See e.g. "Code of Professional Conduct", art. 13.4, online: Family Mediation Canada
<http://www.fmc.ca/code.htm> (date accessed:21 May 2002).
6 See R.A.B.Bush & J.P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994)
for an example of the transformative approach. See C. Menkel-Meadow, "Toward Another View of
Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving" (1984) 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 754 [hereinafter
"Another View of Legal Negotiation"] for an example of the problem-solving approach. See R.
Fisher, W. Ury & B. Patton, GettingtoYes: NegotiatingAgreementWithout GivingIn, 2d ed. (New York:
Penguin Books, 1991) for an example of the principled approach based on the work of the Harvard
Negotiation Project. There is also a lively ongoing debate over the relative merits of facilitative and
evaluative mediation. See e.g. J.J. Alfini, "Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion"
(1997-98) 24 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 919 and "Symposium" in [2000] 2 J. Disp. Resol. 245.
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precisely what troubles many critics of mediation. The exercise of this
broad discretion often comes down to on-the-spot judgments made as the
dialogue unfolds, reflecting instinctive preferences over style and strategy.
The pressured and rapidly moving circumstances of a mediation mean that
the practical potential for extended discussion on questions of process
management or mediation style, either with the parties themselves or a comediator, or even reflection by a solo mediator, is often lacking. Aside from
egregious process abuse or party misconduct, the mediator's judgements
are often invisible to the parties themselves.
II.

EFFORTS TO COMPENSATE FOR INFORMALITY

One response to the difficulty of promoting a process that is so
dependent on individual idiosyncracy is the development of training
conventions regarding procedure in mediation. Characteristically, these
include opening statement protocols which afford equitable speaking time
to each party, attention to balancing representation on each side, and
equitable time spent in private caucus with each party. Conventions provide
useful procedural safeguards against unbalanced processes that may
otherwise be dominated by stronger parties. However, these safeguards
represent the tip of the iceberg in relation to the scope and complexity of
ethical issues that might arise in mediation.
The development of codes of conduct for mediators is another
widely promoted response to concerns about fairness in mediation
processes. Codes of conduct are usually framed as generalized
commentaries on the mediation process and the mediator's role. They
characteristically include the mediator's commitment to a set of key values
such as voluntariness, lack of coercion, and party self-determination, and
stipulate responses in given situations; for example, how the mediator
should respond to what is often described as "bad faith" by one or more
parties or a proposal for an apparently unfair agreement. Many codes also
include assumptions about the general nature of impartiality, expertise, and
fairness. Codes of conduct for mediators have proliferated in North
America over the past ten years.7 Prominent examples include the code of

7 Several codes of conduct for mediators were reviewed for this article. See "Code of Conduct",
online: ADR Institute of Canada <http://www.amic.org/rules/conduct.html> (date accessed: 21 May
2002) [hereinafter "SPIDR Code of Conduct"]; "Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility",
online: Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution <http://www.spidr.org/ethic.htm> (date
accessed: 21 May 2002) [hereinafter "SPIDR Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility"];
"Practice, Certification and Training Standards", online: Family Mediation Canada
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conduct developed by the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution,
in partnership with the American Arbitration Association and the
American Bar Association,8 and the Standards of Practice for the Academy
of Family Mediators.9 In Canada, Family Mediation Canada' 1 and the
Canadian Bar Association-Ontario" have produced influential codes.
Codes of conduct have both moral and political significance as an
effort to set benchmarks and parameters for appropriate conduct. Professor
Robert Bush describes the need for ethical standards for mediators that
"identify the hazards and point in the right direction."' 12 In theory, codes
provide a means of ascertaining a mediator's commitment to a particular

<http://www.fmc.ca/certification.htm> (date accessed: 21 May 2002) [hereinafter "FMC Practice,
Certification and Training Standards"]; "Canadian Bar Association-Ontario Model Code of Conduct",
online: Stitt Feld Handy Group <http://www.adr.ca/news/cbao.asp> (date accessed: 21 May 2002)
[hereinafter "CBAO Model Code of Conduct"]; "Code of Conduct: Ontario Mandatory Mediation
Program", online: Ministry of Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.
gov.on.ca/html/manmed/codecncdt.htm> (date accessed: 21 May 2002); "Florida Rules for Certified
and Court-Appointed
Mediators",
online:
Florida State
Courts
<http://www.flcourts.org/osca/divisions/adr/certrules.htm > (date accessed: 21 May 2002) [hereinafter
"Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators"]; "Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce
Mediation",
online:
Association
for Conflict
Resolution
<http://www.acresolution.org/research.nsf/key/stand-prac> (date accessed: 21 May 2002) [hereinafter
"Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation"]I; "Standards of Practice for California
Mediators", online: California Dispute Resolution Council <http://www.cdrc.net/standards.html>
(date accessed: 21 May 2002) [hereinafter "CDRC Standards of Practice for California Mediators"];
Minnesota GeneralRules of Practice, Final Draft 10/30/96, r. 114, s.v. "Code of Ethics" [hereinafter
"Code of Ethics (Minnesota)"]; "Kansas Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family
Disputes", online: Kansas Judicial Branch <http://www.kscourts.org/ctruls/adrapp.htm> (date
accessed: 21 May 2002); "Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court: Rules Relating to Mediation", r. 903,
online: Kansas Judicial Branch <http://www.kscourts.org/ctruls/adrruls.htm > (date accessed: 21 May
2002); "Proposed Model Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral" (1999),
online: CPR Institution for Dispute Resolution <http://www.cpradr.org/cpr-george.html> (date
accessed: 21 May 2002); R.A.B. Bush, "The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical
Dilemmas and Policy Implications" [1994] 1 J. Disp. Resol. I at 50-55 [hereinafter "Dilemmas of
Mediation Practice]; and "Standards of Professional Practice for Mediators, Illinois", online:
Mediate.com <http://www.mediate.com/articles/illstds.cfm> (date accessed: 8 July 2002).
8 See "SPIDR Code of Conduct", supra note 7. See also "SPIDR Ethical Standards of
Professional Responsibility", supra note 7.
9 See "Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation", supra
note 7.
10 See "FMC Practice, Certification and Training Standards", supra note 7.
See "CBAO Model Code of Conduct", supra note 7. A slightly modified version
of this Code
is used for the Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program, established under Rule 24.1 of the Ontario
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Courts of JusticeAct, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as am. by 0. Reg. 453/98,
s.1.
12 "Dilemmas of Mediation Practice", supra note 7 at 4.
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set of values and objectives for the process, although these are usually

framed in very general terms. Codes of conduct also frequently set out
important parameters. For example, they may constrain the mediator from
providing an evaluative opinion on the merits and prohibit any person in a

conflict of interest to act as a mediator. They also may specify the
circumstances under which concerns for party safety will override
confidentiality.13 Thus, codes tend to compensate for the absence of a
formal structure in mediation by setting out some minimum expectations
for the process. Furthermore, a code of conduct may assist a party to
launch a complaint against a mediator who agreed to abide by the
principles of a particular code, but apparently acted in breach of one or

more of the code's provisions." Most importantly, codes of conduct along
with the development of a legal standard of care for mediators15 provide the
trappings of respectability and
credibility for a new group of specialists
16
seeking professional status.

Most practising mediators recognize that the generality of these
standards seriously limits their usefulness in resolving dilemmas raised by
the interaction of the parties and the mediator. In practice, many situations
seem to fall outside any given principle or parameter. For example, what
should the mediator do when one side accuses the other of lying? How

should the mediator respond when a party refuses to disclose a significant
document because they do not trust the other side to keep it confidential?
While codes of conduct offer general guidance for issues such as abuse of

13 Codes have tended toward a litany of restraints rather than positive obligations
for mediators.
For a striking exception, see "Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators", supra note
7, r. 10.350 which states "a mediator shall be patient, dignified, and courteous during the mediation
process."
14 Although it is not clear how particular codes would be enforced, or what sanctions would
apply, in the event of a complaint of a breach. Under the Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program,
Local Mediation Committees (LMC) must compile a roster of mediators who, in turn, are required to
abide by the Program's Code of Conduct, an adaptation of the Canadian Bar Association-Ontario
Model Code of Conduct. See "CBAO Model Code of Conduct", supra note 7. The LMC may revoke
membership of the roster or refuse to renew it, but it is not clear under what circumstances. The LMC
must also investigate complaints brought under the program's complaints procedure. For a forthright
approach to the question of an effective complaints process, see P. Portlock, "Certification and
Complaints" (1996) 8:4 Interaction 10.
15 See J.L. Schulz, "Mediator Liability in Canada: An Examination of Emerging American and
Canadian Jurisprudence" (2000-01) 32 Ottawa L. Rev. 269.
16 By publicly committing to standards of ethical practice, dispute resolution professionals seek
to avail themselves of the traditional bargain of self-regulation. For a discussion, see C.D. Schneider,
"A Commentary on the Activity of Writing Codes of Ethics" in J. Lemmon, ed., Making Ethical
Decisions (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985) 83 at 83-84.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 40, NO. I

process, party self-determination, and good-faith bargaining, applying these
principles requires the exercise of personal discretion and an understanding
of context. Even if it were possible to make the articulated standard both
specific and complete, it is difficult to imagine how it might take into
account the organic and dynamic character of the mediation process. Codes
tend to present a series of standardized problems-an apparently unfair
outcome, the appearance of coercion, or mediator bias-and suggest
appropriate or ideal responses. This conveys the misleading impression that
mediation ethics are limited to particular aspects of the practice of
mediation (such as ensuring that the mediator is impartial and free from
any conflicts of interest), or to extreme choices (such as between
terminating a mediation or continuing). The codes seem to imply that such
choices are culturally or situationally neutral. Codes are not a panacea for
resolving the moral dilemmas of unregulated, informal third party
intervention in disputes, nor are they likely to have a direct impact on
consumer experiences of mediation.17 But if not codes, then what?
This article explores and attempts to expand our understanding of
what amounts to ethical decision making in mediation. I shall argue that
part of the difficulty of relying on codes for guidance is that they assume a
narrow, abstract, and externalized definition of ethical decision making in
mediation. The expanded understanding proposed in this article views
ethical dilemmas as inherent to the management of a constructive, fair, and
balanced dialogue between parties in conflict, and the exercise of personal
judgment in relation to ethical practice choices as intrinsic to the mediator's
role. I shall propose a "reflective-practice"' 8 approach as an alternative or
complementary vehicle to codes of conduct for thinking about and
communicating mediation ethics, using as illustration two case studies from
my own practice. I shall argue that this reflective-practice model holds
greater promise for both conceptualizing and promoting ethical decision

17 For an excellent review and appraisal of codes of conduct, see C. Morris, "The Trusted
Mediator: Ethics and Interaction in Mediation" in J. Macfarlane, ed., Rethinking Disputes: The
MediationAlternative (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1997) 301 [hereinafter "Trusted Mediator"].
Morris also offers a model for a personally constructed approach to mediation ethics which
foreshadows many of the ideas in this article.
18 See C. Argyris & D.A. Sch6n, Theory in Practice: IncreasingProfessionalEffectiveness (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974) [hereinafter Theory in Practice];D.A. Sch6n, The Reflective Practitioner:
How ProfessionalsThink inAction (New York: Basic Books, 1983) [hereinafter Reflective Practitioner];
and D.A. Sch6n, Educatingthe Reflective Practitioner:Toward a New Designfor Teachingand Learning
in the Professions(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987) [hereinafter Educatingthe Reflective Practitioner].
See also M.D. Lang & A. Taylor, The Making of a Mediator: Developing Artistry in Practice (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000).
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making in mediation than the written codes of conduct on which we
presently rely.
III.

WHAT DOES MEDIATING ETHICALLY MEAN?

Ethics are generally understood as the choice between two or more
competing courses of action, where one choice, made on the basis of a
particular principle or value, will be morally superior to the other.' 9
Mediators must constantly choose which types of intervention techniques
and strategies they will use, raising issues well beyond those commonly
understood as ethical dilemmas in mediation."z The first choice faced by a
mediator is whether or not to directly intervene at a given moment-by
asking a question, making a suggestion, or providing a short summary--or
to remain silent and let the events naturally unfold. Once a mediator
decides to intervene, a multiplicity of further choices open up. Will the
mediator suggest a different and less inflammatory way of framing the
issues as tempers rise, or will the mediator move the parties to a less
contentious topic? Will the mediator call a private caucus, and if so, which
party will the mediator meet with first? What will the mediator say to a
party who is speaking loudly or aggressively? The choices for process
management and strategic intervention within mediation are endless. Even
outside formal meetings, further issues may arise once negotiations are
underway. Will the mediator call a party between sessions when there is
concern about that individual's level of comfort, commitment, or
understanding of the process? Is it appropriate for the mediator to speak
to one party, or the party's counsel, about seriously considering the
settlement offer made by the other side? In the micro-management of
dialogue that is the mediator's task, the list of choices for action is
interminable. Implicit in each decision is a balancing of alternate courses
of action and an appraisal of how far each advances the goals-and the
mediator's understanding of the underlying values-of the mediation
process.

19

See The Canadian Oxford Dictionary,s.v. "ethics" which is described as "the
science of morals
inhuman conduct." See also ibid., s.v. "morals" which are defined as "the distinction between right and
wrong." The usefulness of this dichotomy in the context of mediation is further discussed in Part
IV(A).
20
Typically these include the mediator's impartiality, their freedom from conflicts of interest, and
confidentiality in all but exceptional circumstances. A contemporary Western model of mediation
assumes these to be central aspects of the mediator's role and any departure from these norms is
viewed as an egregious breach of responsibility.
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But do all such choices raise questions of ethics? Some choices
appear to be functional; for example, whether to use a round table or a
rectangular one. Other choices are apparently dictated by practical
circumstances; for example, can the first meeting between the parties be
scheduled in the evening, as the plaintiffs prefer? Yet others are simply
expedient; for example, what should a mediator do to silence Party A in
order to prevent Party B from leaving? An ethical choice implies a
principled or value basis for decision making rather than simple
expediency, logic, or other legal, economic, or social pressures. However,
this distinction may not be very helpful in the context of mediation. Even
the most mundane and mechanical decisions have a habit of turning into
issues of principle in the volatile climate of conflict. For example, the
plaintiffs refusal to meet during the daytime is characterized by the
defendants as "typical of their uncooperative stance." Thus the question of
scheduling, and how the mediator deals with it, is transformed into an
ethical dilemma. The mediator must decide whose preference shall prevail
and what values are implicated. Deciding whether or not and how to quiet
Party A thirty minutes into his or her monologue raises fundamental
questions about the role of parties and mediators in a facilitated dialogue.
Some mediators contend that Party A should talk for as long as necessary
and that Party B, alone, must decide whether to stay or leave; others argue
that the mediator's basic responsibility is to ensure an equitable sharing of
speaking time. Even the design of the meeting table may convey an
important message about the values of the mediation process. Bush has
noted that the ethical dilemmas identified by practising mediators tend to
reflect value dilemmas over the mediator's role.2 The mediator makes
innumerable choices while managing the process and interaction between
the parties, and these choices go to the root of the values that the
mediation process espouses.22 Accordingly, each time an intervention is
made, there is at least the potential for a principled choice that seeks either
consciously or unconsciously to promote those values.
Are there ways to narrow the scope of ethical decision making in
mediation? One approach, which excludes apparently trivial or mundane
choices, is to conceive as ethical only choices over action or inaction which

21 In a survey, practising mediators were asked to identify an ethical dilemma that they had
faced
in their practice. See "Dilemmas of Mediation Practice", supra note 7 at 43.
22 A similar point has been made about the relationship between conceptualization of the
lawyering role and legal ethics. "Legal ethics is the applied philosophy of lawyering; it goes to the heart
of what it means to be a lawyer." See A.M. Dodek, "Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of
Scholarship" (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 115 at 116.
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have the potential to influence the ensuing outcome. Understanding ethical
choices as those having the potential to influence outcome is an interesting
conceptualization because it highlights the moral responsibility implicit in
the mediator's role. However, it could be argued that everything a mediator
says or does has the potential to influence outcome. Negotiation is an
incremental process, and settlement may suddenly materialize, or
vapourize, in unexpected and sometimes quite mysterious ways.23 Part of
the complexity of mediation is discerning what does and does not influence
the parties and how. Thus, defining ethical decision making as choices that
may influence outcomes may also amount to everything a mediator says or
does.2 4 Even if it were possible to draw such distinctions, limiting the
characterization of ethical choices to those that influence outcomes
probably underestimates the moral complexity and significance of other
mediator actions. Choosing to give priority, for example, to the plaintiffs
scheduling requirements may have no apparent effect on the outcome of
a particular negotiation, but it may influence the defendant's appraisal of
the process and their willingness to use mediation again. The reality of
mediation is that ethical judgment making occurs constantly, intuitively,
and often unconsciously.
If we understand ethical decision making in mediation as any valuebased choice, either conscious or unconscious, between alternate courses
of action, the range of issues that we understand as ethical expands
exponentially. Moreover, some issues which are conventionally described
as ethical issues, such as mediator neutrality and freedom from conflicts of
interest, begin to look like questions of threshold qualification rather than
choices between alternate courses. Mediators appear to confront a unique
level of ethical decision making in their work as a consequence of their role
in managing party interaction and their responsibility for both the integrity
of the process and the comfort of the parties. Other types of third-party
intervention, such as the work of judges or arbitrators, do not face the same
scope of choice in ethical matters, as they are constrained by external rules
and a journey toward a fixed end. The judgments made by mediators in
managing party interactions are closer to the strategic choices made by
lawyers when they negotiate with opposing counsel. However, unlike
mediation, traditional lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations tend to adopt a highly
ritualized format which is focused on formulating and rebutting substantive

23 See J. Macfarlane, "Why Do People Settle?" (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 663 at 668-69.
24 For a similar approach, see M.L. Rhodes, Ethical Dilemmas in Social Work
Practice(Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
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arguments over the appropriate application of external standards;
interaction is significantly less organic than in mediation." Ethical
dilemmas tend to arise out of a narrower band of behaviours and actions,
and are generally more predictable.26 Moreover, the framing of ethical
responsibility is clearly different for an advocate than for a third party who
owes an equal responsibility to all parties. A closer parallel with mediators
might be the work of counsellors or therapists, who also work in private
sessions with clients, and who exercise a similar discretion in goal setting
and issue framing.27
IV.

CODES OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING
IN MEDIATION

Each time a mediator wonders "What should I do in this situation?"
and where there are no clear external rules governing the choice of action
or inaction, there is the potential for a value-based decision reflecting
either an explicit or implicit principle about the goals of mediation. Leda
Cooks and Claudia Hale make a similar point when they argue that ethical
choices take place in the fashioning of all storytelling and occur "as part of
the sense making in everyday, mundane experience." 8 Codes of conduct
understand ethical decision making in mediation quite differently. Codes
reduce ethical choices to a set of generic principles, fastening on relatively
uncontentious virtues for the mediation process, which appear in a virtually
identical form across numerous codes of conduct.2 9 Ethical issues are
identified as discrete topics such as mediator impartiality, conflicts of

25 See e.g. "Another View of Legal Negotiation", supra note 6; C. Menkel-Meadow,
"Lawyer
Negotiations: Theories and Realities-What We Learn from Mediation" (1993) 56 Mod. L. Rev. 361
[hereinafter "Lawyer Negotiations"]; and S.H. Clarke, E.D. Ellen & K. McCormick, Court-Ordered
Civil Case Mediation in North Carolina:An Evaluation of Its Effects (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995).
26 See e.g. J.J.
White, "Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation"
[1980] Am. B. Found. Res. J.926. See generally C. Menkel-Meadow, "Ethics in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: New Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyer's Responsibilities"
(1997) 38 S.Tex. L. Rev. 407.
27 See e.g. D. Fernhoff, "The Valued Therapist" in M. Goldberg, ed., Against the Grain: New

Approaches to Professional Ethics (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1993) 55.
28 L.M. Cooks & C.L. Hale, "The Construction of Ethics in Mediation" (1994-95)
12 Mediation
Q. 55 at 72.
29 Ibid. at 61. However ,despite the apparent consensus among codes over some of the goals of
the process, there is little consistency in professional practice.
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interest, and self-determination; ethical dilemmas are those that threaten
the integrity of these principles. Codes of conduct for mediators also
assume that it is possible to describe and regulate the process of dialogue
and the content of dialogue quite separately. Principles for process
management dominate codes of conduct for mediators and often precede
the commencement of dialogue (for example, principles governing set-up).
This dichotomy permits the development of a core of principles for process
management in mediation which are presented as applicable regardless of
context and circumstance. Separating process and content in this way
obscures the dynamic relationship between the process and content of
dialogue in mediation, 30 and serves to further distance codes from the
practical exigencies of ethical decision making.
The mismatch between the assumptions of codes of conduct and the
ways in which ethical dilemmas actually arise in mediation leads to a series
of further problems, three of which are highlighted below.
A.

A Right-Wrong Paradigmof Action

A general premise of professional codes of conduct is that the
ethical dilemmas of practice admit of morally "right" and "wrong"
responses which are applicable to others acting in similar situations. To the
extent that this is the case, agreement on shared standards of professional
practice may answer questions of alternate principled choice. Sometimes
these standards are determined by laws or regulations external to the ethics
code itself. For example, engineers "shall approve only those engineering
documents that are in conformity with accepted standards" and they "shall
not complete, sign, or seal plans and/or specifications that are not in
conformity with applicable engineering standards."3 1 The practical utility
of promoting professional approaches within a code of conduct largely
depends on the extent to which particular ethical dilemmas, and the
circumstances under which they arise, can be accurately predicted. 3' For
example, following a series of recent accounting scandals, the American

30

See S.Cobb, "Einsteinian Practice and Newtonian Discourse: An Ethical Crisis in Mediation"

(1991) 7 Negotiation J. 87. This suggests that the distinction drawn in Coyle, supra note 2 at 636-67
between the procedural and substantive dimensions of fairness is a false dichotomy.
31 "NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers", ps. 11(b), l11(2)(b), online: National Society
of
Professional Engineers <http://www.nspe.org/ethics/ehl-code.asp> (date accessed: 21 May 2002).
32 However, a dilemma that can be readily anticipated and easily identified, because a clear and
uniform best practice has been set out, is no longer a true dilemma but rather a formalized
professional response.
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banking industry is currently engaged in discussions over the development
of appropriate standards for risk management and disclosure
responsibilities for financial institutions. The debate over revisions to the
so-called risk-cased capital management functions of banks is centred
around agreements on standards which can anticipate (by applying
minimum capital requirements), and forewarn (via a supervisory review
process) in order to reduce the chances of excessive exposure and risk.33
While there will always be room to argue over the cases-by-case application
of any such rules, they are a good example of a professional ethical
response to circumstances that can be anticipated, and where the
appropriate ethical response-to protect banks and their investor clients by
minimizing risk-is self-evident.
In other types of professional practice, a particular problem may
arise fairly regularly, for example, the use of apparently "bad faith"
negotiation tactics in mediation. In this case, both the problem and the
appropriate ethical response are less amenable to clear definition. An
exception is the rare instance where this problem occurs in an extreme
manner.34 Ordinarily, the identification of the problem is a function of the
context in which it arises; in turn, the context affects the appraisal of how
to respond. The ambiguities created by context may be even more
pronounced where, as in mediation, ethical dilemmas characteristically
arise from the management of human relationships rather than procedures
(for example, accounting auditing) or events (for example, trading insider
information). The types of ethical dilemmas that arise in the course of
managing client relationships are also likely to be less predictable, making
the exercise of individual discretion inevitable. Where discretion is intrinsic
to professional decision making, it is generally a response to unique
circumstances, and thinking of ethical choices in terms of "right" and
"wrong" becomes increasingly problematic. Some professional codes
explicitly acknowledge the reliance placed on individual judgment and
recognize that this will critically shape the actual implementation of formal

See "Bank for International Settlements Committee on Banking Supervision", online:
American Bankers Association <http://www.aba.com/industry+issues/grrcbis rbc-sum.htm> (date
accessed: 3 July 2002). The present regulations which are contained in the 1988 Capital Accord are
considered to be insufficient in light of evolving financial services and products.
For example, persisting by threats or using abusive or offensive language. The most extreme
and obvious example of process abuse that I have come across in my practice occurred when a plaintiff
used the mediation meeting as an opportunity to serve court documents on the defendants who had
travelled two hundred kilometres to attend in a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute.
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guidelines.35 Where individual discretion is integral to decision making, a
professional code of conduct can provide a common set of values and a
starting point for thinking about ethical choices; but its usefulness may
depend on how far the specific profession is prepared to recognize and
tolerate diversity. Within the mediation community, there is a widespread
assumption that there is, and should be, diversity in practice. Practitioners
are expected to have a significant degree of personal autonomy in steering
the mediation process in the direction they believe best, and the exercise of
individual discretion permeates every mediator behaviour promulgated by
codes of conduct. All the more striking, then, is the presentation of codes
of conduct for mediators as universal moral principles for practice, and the
absence of any acknowledgment of the critical role of individual judgment
and discretion.
Choices made while exercising professional discretion will always
reflect the mediator's personal values and experiences, including those that
precede and supercede a particular mediation.36 For example, the manner
in which mediators choose to deal with high emotions reflects the meaning
they construe from this behaviour.3 7 Rather than being universal in nature,
or somehow beyond cultural differences, the experiencing of emotion, and
our responses to it, rest on particular cultural meanings and consequent
moral orders.3" Some mediators respond to destructive behaviours by being
directive and controlling; others prefer to let storms blow over by
themselves. Some feel that emotions play an important role in mediation;
others do not. Personal values are neither fixed nor static; the mediator's
personal response to this conflict, and these particular parties, is also
affected by the dialogue emerging between them. In each case, there is a
relationship between the espoused values of a particular code, or the

35

Compare "APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct", Preamble,
online:
American Psychological Association <www.apa.org/ethics/code.html > (date accessed: 24 May 2002)
[hereinafter "APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct"]. The Preamble concludes
"[elach psychologist supplements, but does not violate, the Ethics Code's values and rules on the basis
of guidance drawn from personal values, culture, and experience."
S.C. Grebe, K. Irvin & M. Lang, "A Model for Ethical Decision Making in
Mediation" (198990) 7 Mediation Quarterly 133 at 142-43. For a case study that raises a particularly explicit personal
moral issue, see Part VII.
37 Feminist theory uniquely emphasizes the significance of individual,
experiential, and affective
responses to the world. See e.g. J. Macfarlane, "A Feminist Perspective on Experience-Based Learning
and Curriculum Change" (1994) 26 Ottawa L. Rev. 357 at 379-82.
W.B. Pearce & S.W. Littlejohn, Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide (Thousand
Oaks,
Cal.: Sage Publications, 1997) at 65-67.
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mediation philosophy to which a mediator subscribes, and the mediator's
intuitive choices and assumptions. Occasionally, espoused values are
thoroughly internalized and mesh seamlessly with personal values; however,
there will often be some, perhaps unarticulated, tension. Where there is
unresolved tension between these two influences on decision making, this
dissonance will likely be resolved in favour of intuitive values.39

The centrality of personal discretion to mediation practice means
that ethicalpracticemust respond to the unique situational constraints and
possibilities of each mediation, whereas ethical standards are unable to do
so. The context of any one dialogue, including the evolving interactive
dynamics, inevitably impacts any absolute standard. For example, decisions
on whether or not to settle, and for what, always occur within situational
constraints. Generally, each negotiating party enjoys some degree of
power-whether moral, legal, practical, or simply nuisance 4 -and also
experiences some constraints on their preferred courses of action as a
consequence of the power held by the other side. If a party knows that a
continuing conflict will expose them to the verbal hostilities of their
opponent who may have the power to damage their reputation, business
interests, or relationships with others, does agreeing to settle diminish their
self-determination, or is it a pragmatic appraisal of their best interests?
What should a mediator do when one party's decision will apparently be
affected by the relative power and authority of the individual making
promises on the other side? In practice, the mediator must judge the
acceptable levels of free will and coercion within the context of the
particular relationship, the discourse between the parties, and the
interaction between the parties and the mediator, including any bargains,
explicit or implicit, that have been made over how the process will be
conducted. The mediator must be sensitive to party needs and expectations,
including the cultural norms of the parties41 and what is at stake for them,

39 See generally Educating the Reflective Practitioner, supra note 18. See also the discussion
in Part
V at 24-25.
40 In my experience, a complex power dispersal is far more common than a clear power
imbalance, although some negotiations do inevitably manifest this type of clear inequality. For an
excellent analysis of the possible sources of power in negotiation, see B. Mayer, "The Dynamics of
Power in Mediation and Negotiation" in C.W. Moore, ed., Practical Strategies for the Phases of
Mediation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987) 75; B. Mayer, The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A
Practitioner's Guide (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000) c. 3.
41 The cultural norms of the parties will be an important variable in comparing
party behaviour
to any given standard. Michelle LeBaron Duryea makes a similar point in relation to performance
assessment standards for mediators, arguing that it is misleading to imagine that these could be
complied in a culturally neutral manner. See M. LeBaron Duryea, "The Quest for Qualifications: A
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and the stage the dispute is at because behaviour might also reflect the ebb
and flow of escalation and de-escalation. What might be unacceptable in
one context might be regarded as part of the expected rough and tumble of
settlement negotiations in another. In these ways, the principle of selfdetermination is constantly mediated by the realities of power and
accountability, and the formal definitions provided in codes of conduct can
be contrasted with the nuance and subtlety of the dialogue which actually
takes place.
The exercise of personal discretion in the real-time context of
mediation means that what appears to be the right choice in one situation
may not be right in another. Outside the internal coherence of a particular
mediation philosophy, there can be no clear and universal basis for
determining a morally superior choice. In this way, the whole notion of
ethical behaviour is problematized within the context of mediation. In fact,
a search for "right answers" or "moral solutions" to ethical dilemmas may
undermine the hallmarks of facilitative mediation practice, namely
contextual responsiveness, openness, and flexibility. Mediators confronting
ethical dilemmas, as they are defined in this article, are more likely to be
looking for the "best" course rather than a universal "right" one. While
they may certainly wish to avoid a "wrong" decision which might harm the
parties or the process, they are unlikely to find an uncontentious and
universally applicable solution to any of the dilemmas they encounter in
practice.
B.

Standard-Setting "Snapshots"

Any standard-setting instrument must determine at what temporal
point the given standard will apply; it must create a "snapshot" or series of
snapshots for evaluation purposes. This immediately raises structural
problems for codes of conduct for mediators. Codes developed for
mediators usually focus on principles for pre-mediation set-up such as
ensuring the mediator's impartiality, lack of conflicts of interest,42 the

Quick Trip Without a Road Map" in C. Morris & A. Pirie, eds., Qualifications for Dispute Resolution:
Perspectiveson the Debate (Victoria: UVic Institute for Dispute Resolution, 1994) 109.
42 See e.g. "SP!DR Code of Conduct", supra note 7, ss. 11,111; "CBAO Model Code of Conduct",
supra note 7, ss. IV, V; "Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation", supra note 7, s. IV;
and "CDRC Standards of Practice for California Mediators", supra note 7, s. 2.
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guarantee of confidentiality throughout the entire process,43 and that the
parties understand the process they are about to engage in," as well as the
evaluative criteria for the mediation's conclusion, should an agreement
result.
Codes of conduct quite reasonably assume that ethical dilemmas
can often be avoided by planning for readily anticipated issues. However,
while there are important preliminary questions about the mediator,
process, and preparedness of the parties, ethical dilemmas also emerge
during mediation despite careful attention to set-up; only so much can be
predicted in advance.4 5 The other structural premise of codes of conduct is
that mediation processes will be judged primarily by their outcomes.
Consequentially, codes generally include standards for evaluating final
outcomes such as the importance of informed decision making and party
self-determination, the absence of any coercion or pressure to settle, and
sometimes the reasonableness and fairness of the outcome itself.4 6 Of
course, it is easier to apply standards to concrete outcomes than to other
moments in the process or to the experience as a whole. For example, did
the parties feel fairly treated throughoutthe process? Did they feel that the
mediator always took their concerns seriously? Did they at any time feel
coerced? Consider code provisions on self-determination. These are

43 See e.g. "SPIDR Code of Conduct", supra note 7, s. V; "CBAO Model Code of
Conduct",
supra note 7, ss. VI; and "Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation", supra note 7, s.
VI.
44 See e.g. "CBAO Model Code of Conduct", supra note 7, s. VII(1); "Standards of Practice
for
Family and Divorce Mediation", supra note 7, s. 111.
Interestingly, a similar approach to specifying the conditions for set-up is found in "APA
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct", supra note 35. Specifically, Rule 4.02
imposes the obligation to ensure that the patient begins therapy only after giving informed consent to
treatment and Rule 5.01 (b) requires a discussion of confidentiality and its limitations to occur "at the
outset of the relationship and thereafter as new circumstances may warrant." Other than the need to
possibly revisit the issue of confidentiality, there is little guidance about how to manage the ongoing
patient relationship aside from Rule 4.05 which strictly prohibits sexual relationships with patients.
46 Examples include "Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation", supra note 7, s.
X(d) which requires the mediator to terminate the mediation if"a reasonable agreement is unlikely";
"SPIDR Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility", supra note 7, s. 6 which requires the
mediator to ensure that agreements "will not impugn the integrity of the process"; and "Florida Rules
for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators", supra note 7, r. 10.042(b)(3) which terminates "the
mediation if the mediator believes the- case is unsuitable for mediation or any party is unable or
unwilling to participate meaningfully in the process." See also "SPIDR Ethical Standards of
Professional Responsibility", supra note 7, s.v. "unrepresented interests"; "Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation", supra note 7, s. VII(b) which ensure that any third parties' interests
which may be affected by a settlement are taken into account in a final agreement.
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generally expressed in terms of the final result; for instance, "voluntary and
non-coerced decisions regarding the possible resolution of any issue in
dispute.,, 47 However, practising mediators know that it is common for
parties to admit, at the successful conclusion of negotiations, to feelings of
coercion earlier in the process, overridden by a sense of relief that an
agreement has been reached. Does this mean that mediators have failed in
their ethical duty to ensure self-determination? How far do mediators
encroach upon self-determination when they encourage the parties to stay
in the process and keep trying for a solution? If the parties are ultimately
happy that they did continue, is it only the end result that matters? If so,
what about second thoughts a week later? Do these considerations matter
for an ethical standard of self-determination?4 8
Focusing evaluative criteria on outcomes is more than simply
methodologically expedient; it also assumes, borrowing from the
adjudicative paradigm, that what matters most to the disputants is the
outcome. The focus of codes of conduct on beginnings and endings seems
to reflect the assumptions of the adjudicative process, which is primarily
evaluative in function and in which, as a consequence, results are
understood to be what matters.4 9 In a trial process, every choice and every
step is directed at the substantive evaluation of the contentious issues and
their final determination. As a result, success is measured by outcome.
Mediation is quite a different process with no fixed end point. Ongoing
decisions over process may reflect other goals such as enabling each party
to contribute their perspective to the dialogue, explaining and clarifying the
sources of the conflict, or encouraging collaborative problem solving by the
parties. Mediation is as much a process, replete with ongoing negotiated
understandings, as it is a result.5 ° The "snapshots" represented by

"CBAO Model Code of Conduct", supra note 7,
s. 111(1).

48 Of the codes reviewed for this article, only the "Florida Rules for Certified and CourtAppointed Mediators", supra note 7, r. 10.310, refer to the mediator's need to protect party selfdetermination.
49
This, at least, is true in the minds of process specialists, namely adjudicators, lawyers, and
other
advocates. But this assumption is contradicted by a credible body of research on so-called procedural
justice which consistently demonstrates that fairness of process is equally or possibly more important
to disputants than the final outcome when they come to appraise their dispute resolution experience.
See e.g. J. Thibaut el al., "Procedural Justice as Fairness" (1973-74) 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1271; J. Thibaut
& L. Walker, ProceduralJustice:A Psychological Analysis (New York: Erlbaum, 1975); T.R. Tyler,

"Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Test of Four
Models" (1987) 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 333; and E.A. Lind & T.R. Tyler, The Social
Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York: Plenum Press, 1988).
Cooks & Hale, supra note 28 at 58.
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beginnings and endings which dominate standard-setting in codes of
conduct for mediators are but a fragment of this process. Instead, the
expanded definition of what amounts to ethical choices suggested in this
article shifts the focus from an evaluation of end result, or proper
procedure in mediation set-up, to the choices made in the course of micromanaging the dialogue between the parties.
C.

When StandardsCollide

Another problem inherent in a standard-setting model is its
inability to deal with the potential tension between competing principles or
goals. The mediators in Bush's 1989 study identified the collision of
standards within the context of any one intervention as a persistent
dilemma; inevitably, some goals and values in mediation may be competing
and may need to be balanced." How should mediators balance their
responsibility to strongly advocate for a problem-solving solution while
ensuring that the parties do not feel any pressure to remain in the process
if they prefer to withdraw? Codes of conduct, constructed as a set of
universal moral precepts, do not provide the means to resolve this tension;
no existing code of conduct for mediators acknowledges this problem nor
establishes priorities for weighing or choosing between standards.52 For
example, what should a mediator do when one party reveals information in
caucus which they want to keep confidential but the lack of knowledge on
the part of the other party may jeopardize the principle of informed
consent?53 Should the mediator exert energy into a strategy that prioritizes
genuine acknowledgment of the one party's concerns (the principle of
respectful dealing) over encouraging that party to disclose vital information

51 K. Gibson, "The Ethical Basis of Mediation: Why Mediators Need Philosophers" (1989-90)
7 Mediation Q. 41. For a case study of an ethical dilemma in which two conflicting principles were
involved, see Grebe, Irvin & Lang, supra note 36 at 140-46. For an interesting discussion of the tension
created between mediator techniques to persuade the parties to move their negotiations along, and
party voluntariness and autonomy, see D.E. Matz, "Mediator Pressure and Party Autonomy: Are They
Consistent with Each Other?" (1994) 10 Negotiation J. 359. See also Coyle, supra note 2 at 645 for a
discussion of the potential for conflict between the duty to ensure fairness and respect for party
autonomy, and confidentiality.
52 Compare the "Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists", 3d ed., s.v. "When Principles
Conflict", online: Canadian Psychological Association <http://www.cpa.ca/ethics2000.html> (date
accessed: 27 May 2002) which addresses the problem of conflicting principles by anticipating that
ethical principles, in some circumstances, will conflict and therefore each principle can not possibly be
given equal weight. To deal with this problem, a general order is suggested for its four key principles.
53,"Dilemmas of Mediation Practice", supra
note 7 at 41.
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(the principle of full disclosure)? Most of the scenarios collected by Bush
in his 1989 study of mediators reflect an unresolved collision of values.
Each one is relatively uncontroversial as a single principle, but is
problematized when their application places other key values at risk.
The problem of competing principles may be seen as the result of
a contradiction between party autonomy and empowerment, and third
party intervention inherent to many, if not all, mediator strategies. This is
sometimes described as the "strange loop" made by the joining of often
apparently contradictory impulses in mediation, for example, the
mediator's commitment to neutrality, while also being committed to
structuring a dialogue in which each party is able to fully present his or her
own case.14 Achieving the goal of a disclosing, communicative exchange in
mediation almost certainly requires the mediator to be something other
than neutral, in the sense of refraining from intervention. Instead,
intervention may be held up to a standard of non-partisan fairness or
impartiality." Maintaining impartiality while intervening to facilitate
productive dialogue by encouraging or even coaching reticent or
inarticulate parties requires the mediator to perform a delicate balancing
act. This "interactive paradox, 5 6 is the source of many of the tensions
between competing principles and goals widely encountered by practising
mediators.
Perhaps as a consequence of this inherently paradoxical dimension
of the mediator's role, the types of conflicts between competing principles
that arise in practice do not seem readily susceptible to prioritization. For
example, is the higher ethical imperative party self-determination or the
protection of vulnerable parties from inappropriate pressure from the other
side or the mediator? Does the protection of personal privacy and the
honouring of undertakings regarding confidentiality have a higher moral
value than commitment to full and frank disclosure? These values appear
to be incommensurate; that is, they represent different world views and
realities that cannot be "'mapped onto', expressed as, or reduced to the
other." 7 The competing values are neither integrative, nor do they cancel
one another out; instead, the result is some gain and some loss of another

See J. Rifkin, J. Millen & S. Cobb, "Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A
Critique of
Neutrality" (1991-92) 9 Mediation Q. 151.
See the extensive discussion in "Trusted Mediator", supra note 17 at 318-32.
56 Rifkin, Millen & Cobb, supra note 54 at 154.
Pearce & Littlejohn, supra note 38 at
15.
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principle.58 Thus, each case requires some judgement in order to determine
what gain and what loss is ethical.
A standard-setting model, however, exacerbates rather than
resolves these tensions between values. The assumptions of a right-wrong
paradigm-that the practice of ethical mediation is susceptible to universal
and paramount moral principles-cannot accommodate the complexity of
either incommensurability or the "strange loop." A simplified approach
within the standard-setting model would be a hierarchy of obligations in
which mediators are directed to prioritize certain principles over others. 9
This would offer some general guidance and create a semblance of
predictability around ethical decision making. However, a hierarchical
approach can only externalize and objectify values such as impartiality,
confidentiality, and fairness that consistently collide in practice, thus
removing them from the reality of the interaction itself and compounding
the inherent limitations of the standard-setting model described above.
V.

NEW WAYS TO THINK ABOUT MEDIATION ETHICS

Re-framing the questions about when and how mediators make
ethical choices demonstrates the need for a methodological approach that
avoids the "standards trap." Indeed, efforts to regulate ethical behaviour
using codes of conduct may inadvertently reinforce the assumption of
mediation's most vocal critics, namely that what occurs in the interaction
between parties and mediators can be anticipated and generalized
regardless of context."0 There is an implication that problems in mediation
arise mostly in procedural ways-usually by one party taking over and
manipulating the process and the outcome-so that a more complete set
of external constraints and standards would either avert or address these
problems." A common complaint is that the failure of some mediators to
recognize and sanction bad behaviour in mediation, perhaps by terminating
the process, is evidence of the danger of exposing vulnerable parties to such

58 See ibid. at 15ff for a discussion of the application of the concept of incommensurate ends to
conflict analysis.
59"Dilemmas of Mediation Practice", supra note 7 at 44.
60 See e.g. M.J. Bailey, "Unpacking the 'Rational Alternative': A Critical Review of Family
Mediation Movement Claims"(1989) 8 Can. J. Fam. L. 61.
6) See e.g. K.E. Menzel, "Judging the Fairness of Mediation: A Critical Framework" (1991-92)
9 Mediation Q. 3; J. Rifkin, "Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems" (1984)
2 L. & Ineq. 21.
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a level of procedural informality.6 2 While concerns over the potential for
process abuse are justified, and there is some evidence to suggest that
mediators fare poorly in identifying and responding to such behaviours,
both in individual cases and at a systemic level,63 it is misleading to imagine
that oppressive or inappropriate party behaviour can be captured by
generic descriptions within codes of conduct. Codes that attempt to provide
classifications and definitions of bad behaviour and follow these with
prescriptions about appropriate responses by mediators reinforce the
widely held misconception that it is possible to describe and prescribe
behaviour and response in mediation independent of context. In this way,
codes of conduct for mediators appear to be guilty of raising expectations
about ethical certainties that cannot be met. It seems similarly unrealistic
to imagine that the personal awareness of mediators who are slow to
recognize the signs of intimidation and domination will be affected by a
standard in a code of conduct. The discussion undertaken each time a new
code or benchmark for liability standards develops may be absorbing and
useful for those directly involved, but is unlikely to have a long-term impact
on either the ethics or competence of the profession as a whole.64
In order to achieve such results, we need to redirect our efforts
toward uncovering and critiquing the basis for an ethical choice in a given
situation and examining its impact, rather than determining whether it was
the "right" choice. The outcomes of ethical judgments by mediators must
be supported by the reasoned and contextual perspective of that mediator
and that mediation. This epistemological approach to ethical decision
making reflects feminist theories of knowledge which understand truth as
contextual and therefore forever fluid.65 This enables the development of
a process in which individual and experiential truths can be identified,
deconstructed, and shared. The resulting ideas about good practice would
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See E. Kruk, "Power Imbalance and Spouse Abuse in Divorce Disputes:
Deconstructing
Mediation Practice via the 'Simulated Client' Technique" (1998) 12 Int'l J. L. Pol'y & Fam. 1.
63 See e.g. A. Townley, "The Invisible -ism: Heterosexism and the Implications for Mediation"
(1991-92) 9 Mediation Q. 397; T. Grillo, "The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women"
(1990-91) 100 Yale L.J. 1545 at 1590-93. See also Transition House Association of Nova Scotia,
Abused Women in Family Mediation:A Nova Scotia Snapshot (Halifax: The Association, 1996).
64
Recent research on the impact of ethical codes on maintaining standards
of professional
behaviour among lawyers has suggested a similar problem. There is a further suggestion that the
existence of ethical codes serve to limit or inhibit individual reflection and reasoning about moral
problems. See M.A. Wilkinson, C. Walker & P. Mercer, "Do Codes of Ethics Actually Shape Legal
Practice?" (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 645.
65 K.T. Bartlett, "Feminist Legal Methods" (1989-90) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829 at
880-87.
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have the same character as the communicative agreements made between
parties in mediation as they attempt to coordinate their different
understandings and to develop a joint approach that reflects the context of
a particular set of circumstances rather than any universal truths. Such an
approach has been described as "discursive ethics"66 and demands a
commitment to a transparent professional culture of ethical mediator
behaviours. The first step is the development of self-conscious reflection on
practice and the enhancement of commensurate skills and attitudes.
The reflective-practitioner model was first developed by Donald
Sch6n and Chris Argyris in the 1970s and 1980s, and has become highly
influential in a number of professional fields and disciplines.67 This
approach to professional education and training attempts to bridge the gulf
between the acquisition of professional knowledge and competence in
practice. It does so by challenging the traditional assumption that
professional knowledge can be systematized and taught as facts, rules, and
procedures which can then be instrumentally applied to practice
situations.68 Instead, what Sch6n describes as "professional artistry"
requires the capacity to deal with unique and uncertain areas of practice by
drawing on past experiences and by constantly experimenting and revising.
A reflective-practice model requires each practitioner to develop a capacity
for reflective self-analysis of their effectiveness in practice situations and to
adopt a systematic approach to the learning that accrues. Reflective
practice increases professional effectiveness by enhancing awareness of the
impact of contextual factors and constraints, raising the level of
responsiveness and flexibility, and emphasizing self-growth which builds on
experience. Research consistently demonstrates that the individual
practitioners considered by their peers to exemplify excellence are
significantly better than both novices and their more experienced
colleagues at successfully integrating their new experiences into their
existing models of action and knowledge.6 9 Simply put, they are better at

66 Cooks & Hale, supra note 28.
67 See Theoy in Practice,supra note 18; Reflective Practitioner,supra note 18; and Educatingthe
Reflective Practitioner,supra note 18.
68 See also J. Macfarlane, "Look Before You Leap: Knowledge and Learning in Legal Skills
Education" (1992) 19 J. L. & Soc'y 291 [hereinafter "Look Before You Leap"] for a discussion about
the implications of an epistemology of learning; J. Macfarlane, "Assessing the 'Reflective Practitioner':
Pedagogic Principles and Certification Needs" (1998) 5 Int'l J. L. Profession 63 for a discussion about
the models of assessment in professional education.
69 See e.g. M.T.H. Chi, R. Glaser & M.J. Farr, The Nature of Expertise (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum,
1988).
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learning from their experiences because of their superior ability to analyze
and synthesize those lessons.
Reflective practice seems to offer the potential for self-conscious
and context-responsive approaches to ethical choices in mediation without
advocating for a single "right" way. Indeed, Sch6n and Argyris describe
their approach as particularly apposite "for individuals struggling with
difficult current problems, especially ones which have been avoided or
covered up."'7 The reflective-practice model is heavily influenced by a
constructionist perspective; practitioners are seen as actively involved as
they apply their personal values and assumptions to the many unique and
indeterminate areas of practice, and map out professional behaviours and
actions.7" On the surface, professional education and codes of professional
conduct convey the impression that there is a single map and that it is
dominated by the so-called technical-rational model.7z Sch6n's rejection of
the technical-rational model of professional practice means that rather than
simply dealing with things as they are, all professionals-musicians, artists,
lawyers, managers, doctors, or teachers-are directly involved in making
design choices whenever they engage in decision making under anything
other than routine or predictable circumstances. If professional roles are
conceptualized in this way, there can no longer be an assumption of
absolute standards for truth or professional effectiveness in any given area.
Instead, choices may be truthful or effective when analyzed within a specific
frame, such as a particular intervention or mediation, and comparisons
across different frames, while not impossible, become complex.73
The most effective practitioners, argues Sch6n, are those who are
able to engage in "frame reflection," in which they expose their values,
strategies, and assumptions to analysis and evaluation. At its highest level,
this type of reflection aims to make explicit the tacit cognitive assumptions
over practice choices. 7' The aim is to uncover what Sch6n describes as the

70 Theory in Practice,supra note 18 at xxiv.
71 Similar assumptions about the actor's role in conflict and conflict resolution
are reflected in
the work of John Paul Lederach. See e.g. J.P. Lederach, Preparingfor Peace:Conflict Transformation
Across Cultures (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995).
72 For a more detailed discussion of this dimension of Sch6n's work, see "Look Before You
Leap", supra note 68.
73 Educatingthe Reflective Practitioner,supra note
18 at 217-18.
74 Described by Argyris & Sch6n as "double loop" learning. This resonates
with W.B. Pearce's
concept of"coordinated meaning." See e.g. W.B. Pearce, "The Coordinated Management of Meaning:
A Rules-Based Theory of Interpersonal Communication" in G.R. Miller, ed., Explorations in
InterpersonalCommunication (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976) 17.
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practitioner's "theory-in-use." 7 5 Because individual theory-in-use inevitably
only represents truth within a particular frame, the sharing of individual
"theories-in-use" and the commitment to constantly monitor and publicly
test decisions are central to Schbn's methodology of reflective practice.7 6
The reflective-practice model seems especially appropriate to a field such
as mediation that is at an early stage of professional and self-conscious
development, and to a form of intervention that is so diversified,
unregulated, and context-dependent. As an examination of "practitioner
cogitation,"7 7 it focuses on teasing out the values and assumptions behind
the choices often made intuitively by mediation practitioners when they
face ethical dilemmas in the course of their practice and the values they
imply. These values can then be debated, critiqued, and diversified across
different frames of action.
As a contribution to the sharing of mediation narratives which
might enable the development of a reflective approach, I describe below
two mediation sessions that raised especially difficult ethical dilemmas.78
Having confronted the limits of codes to resolve my ethical dilemmas in
each case, I analyze and evaluate the choices I made and try to uncover my
theory-in-use, the hitherto unarticulated basis of the on-the-spot choices
which emerge in mediation. I have included brief descriptions of other
mediation sessions which presented similar or related dilemmas.
VI.

CASE ONE: ANTHONY'S STORY

In this case, the dilemma confronting my co-mediator and I was the
level of comprehension of one of the parties to a proposed agreement. The
agreement actually favoured this individual, but its breach would carry
negative consequences-in all likelihood, an eviction. The absence of legal
counsel or other strong personal representation for this individual
exacerbated our concern over the possible lack of comprehension.

75 Theory in Practice,supra note 18 at 6-18.
76

This is the opposite to the defensiveness that characterizes professional decision making where
there is little emphasis on reflection, which Sch6n describes as "Model I" learning. See Educatingthe
Reflective Practitioner,supra note 18 at 257.
K. Kressel, "Practice-Relevant Research in Mediation: Toward a Reflective Research
Paradigm" (1997) 13 Negotiation J. 143 at 144.
78 In each case,
the parties' names and some other facts have been changed in order to safeguard
anonymity. I have included references in each case study to code of conduct principles that appeared,
at first glance, to be relevant to the dilemmas that arose, in an attempt to connect the universal
prescriptions of the codes to the exigencies of these particular situations.
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Anthony was a tenant in an apartment building belonging to Joe.
Joe had known Anthony and members of Anthony's family for many years.
Anthony owed significant rent arrears to Joe. There were also complaints
that Anthony had been bothering other tenants by making noise and
knocking on their doors late at night. Anthony's health had declined in
recent years and he had experienced periods of deep depression. His social
worker reported that he sometimes became confused and occasionally had
difficulty separating fact from fiction, but she assessed him as able to
participate in the mediation and to comprehend the basis of any proposed
settlement. She was scheduled to accompany Anthony to the mediation,
along with a clinic lawyer. Joe would attend with a paralegal. Having had
some previous experience working with individuals with mental health or
developmental disabilities, I was optimistic that Anthony would find
mediation both helpful and manageable so long as special care was taken
to slow down the process, take frequent breaks, and ensure that everything
was clearly explained.
The clinic lawyer representing Anthony arrived five minutes before
the mediation's start to inform us that the clinic would no longer represent
Anthony because they found him difficult to deal with and had trouble
obtaining clear instructions from him. Anthony said that he was happy to
be rid of a lawyer who did not listen to him. Concerned with the power
imbalance resulting from only one side being legally represented, we asked
Anthony if he wanted to adjourn the mediation in order to retain another
lawyer. Anthony said that he wanted to avoid any delay because he had a
court date scheduled for later that week. We explained that the court date
could also be adjourned, on consent, but Anthony was adamant about
proceeding.
Thirty minutes into the mediation, Anthony started to ramble. He
seemed unfocused and frequently launched into long, complex stories that
appeared, we thought, to be irrelevant to the issues that had been identified
by both parties.79 After an hour, in addition to the difficulty of maintaining
focus, Anthony also appeared to be confused about some of the dispute's
basic details. For example, he now claimed to own the building in which he
lived as Joe's tenant. When this was addressed, it appeared that Anthony
understood himself to be the landlord's agent since he had, in the past,
collected rents from the other tenants on the landlord's behalf. Anthony

79 The issues identified by the parties were rent arrears, complaints from other tenants,
Joe and
Anthony's long-standing personal relationship, and Anthony's expressed interest in purchasing the
building.
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had also discussed buying the property from the landlord a few years ago,
when he was in better health and financial circumstances. It was difficult to
know how far Anthony was using the claim of ownership as an analogy for
his hopes and feelings about his residence, and how far he held this claim
literally.
At around the same time, approximately ninety minutes into the
mediation, the basis of an agreement began to appear. Joe had applied to
the court to evict Anthony for rent arrears. He was now willing to give
Anthony time to pay the arrears and to also investigate his finances to
determine whether he could in fact buy the property. This did not seem
likely since Anthony had a low income and no savings, but throughout the
mediation he. had repeatedly stated that he wanted to explore financing
options. In return, Anthony was asked to stop making the alleged noise that
had been disturbing the building's other tenants, and to desist from
knocking on doors claiming to collect rents on the landlord's behalf. From
discussions with first Anthony, and then Joe, in private caucus, it was
evident that both were eager to draw up and sign this agreement. Anthony's
social worker seemed relieved that such an agreement would, at a
minimum, buy her client some time since a court hearing had been
scheduled for the following day to obtain an eviction order. Asked on
several occasions, including in private caucus, for her view on whether
Anthony fully comprehended the details of the proposed agreement, the
social worker refused to be drawn into a discussion. Although the
agreement favoured Anthony, it did have some negative consequences if he
failed to pay the rent arrears and continued to disturb other tenants. In
these circumstances, Joe would certainly bring Anthony back to court and
if it could be shown that Anthony had not kept his obligations under the
agreement, an eviction order would almost certainly be made.8 °
After a short break in which we conferred privately, my co-mediator
and I concluded that we would not allow Anthony to sign this agreement
because he did not appear to fully understand it or its possible
consequences. We made this judgment in the moment and on the spot
rather than on the basis of expert advice. The most important factor was
that neither of us felt comfortable proceeding. Back in the mediation
session, we explained our concerns and our decision to the parties. Anthony
was very unhappy, repeating that he wanted to sign. Joe was also unhappy
since he wanted to make peace with Anthony. The parties were free, we
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See Tenant Protection Act, S.O. 1997, c. 24, ss. 61(1), 69(1).
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explained, to make their own agreement but we could not continue in this
role with them.
Codes of conduct conventionally emphasize twin principles of client
self-determination (if Anthony says he wants the agreement, the mediator
has no reason to argue with him), and informed choice 8 (all possible
implications of making this agreement must be fully explained, understood,
and accepted). However, codes are not clear about the relationship
between these two principles. In practice, ambiguity over what constitutes
informed choice means that there is often tension between this and selfdetermination, as there was in this case. If the "self' of self-determination
is also the sole arbiter of what constitutes an informed decision, then the
appraisal is an internal, personal one with no role for the mediator. Most
codes suggest that mediators, at a minimum, have a responsibility to
encourage informed choice; most mediators probably understand
themselves as having at least some responsibility for appraising the
sufficiency of a party's relevant knowledge and comprehension when
reaching a decision. However, it is less clear what the moral and practical
scope of the mediator's responsibility is in this regard. In an apparent effort
to limit the mediator's responsibility for ensuring informed choice, the
SPIDR Code of Conduct, along with several other codes,82 distinguish
between the responsibility to ensure that the parties are aware of the
importance of informed decision making-for example, by encouraging
them to consult with another professional-and the responsibility to ensure
that the parties actually make an informed choice. The SPIDR Code of
Conduct limits the obligations of the mediator to the former. Some codes
suggest that to go further than ensuring a party is aware of the importance

81 See e.g. "CBAO Model Code of Conduct", supra note 7, s. 111(4) which states that mediators
have a responsibility to advise unrepresented parties to obtain legal advice, or to consult other
professionals in order to make informed decisions; "Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce
Mediation", supra note 7, s. VIII(a) which states that "[tihe mediator shall encourage and assist the
participants to obtain independent expert information and advice when such information is needed
to reach an informed agreement.... An interesting parallel definition of "informed consent" can be
found in "APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct", supra note 35, p. 4.02(a)
which states that "informed consent generally implies that the person (1) has the capacity to consent,
(2) has been informed of significant information concerning the procedure, (3) has freely and without
undue influence expressed consent, and (4) consent has been appropriately documented." However,
unlike most mediators, psychologists have relevant professional training in order to make an
assessment of clinical capacity to consent. Furthermore, the type of additional external information
significant to consent likely differs for individuals involved in legal disputes than for patients
undergoing psychological examinations.
82 "SPIDR Code of Conduct", supra note 7, s. I, s.v. "Comments"; "Dilemmas of Mediation
Practice", supra note 7, s. IV(d) at 52-53.
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of informed choice may compromise party self-determination. The Florida
Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators state that mediators
must "not offer a personal or professional opinion intended to coerce the
parties, decide the dispute, or direct a resolution of any issue. Consistent
with standards of impartiality and preserving party self-determination,
however a mediator may point out possible outcomes of the case and
discuss the merits of a claim or defence. 83
This particular dilemma is a good example of the inadequacy of
decontextualized theory to prescribe practice in mediation. In practice, the
distinction between making someone aware of the importance of an
informed choice and being satisfied that they actually are informed, is
tenuous. The distinction only works if the disputant comprehends what it
means to be informed or to receive outside advice, whether or not they
choose to do so; this may be an issue for clients other than those with
specific mental health or developmental disabilities. Even then, this may be
a tautology; how can a disputant fully appreciate the significance of
informed choice unless they have been informed about other available
options and choices? Code provisions also leave outstanding and
unacknowledged the question of how to appraise individual understanding
of the significance of informed choice. This varies for every mediation
client and each mediation. What it might mean to satisfy oneself that a
party such as Anthony understood the importance of informed choice
would be completely different than with a commercial client experienced
in litigation.
Some argue that one way to resolve this dilemma is to impose a
minimal requirement that no party to meditation makes an agreement
without having first had access to independent legal advice. For example,
the Professional Standards of Practice for Mediation of the Mediation
Council of Illinois state that "the mediator should ensure that each of the
participants has an understanding of, as well as a reasonable opportunity
to weigh, the application of appropriate legal information to his or her
situation before reaching an agreement."84 This enables the disputant to
appraise a settlement offer by situating it within an alternative (legal) frame
of reference. A more constrained view of this principle is that independent
legal advice should always be provided where legal rights are given up in
exchange for the settlement. The Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation states that the mediator should assist parties to obtain

83 "Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators", supra note 7, r. 10.370(c).
84 "Standards of Professional Practice for Mediators, Illinois", supra note 7, s. VI.
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independent expert advice where it is necessary for informed consent or "to
protect the.rights of a participant."8 5 Consequently, a mediator should
withdraw where a disputant either has no access to, or refuses to obtain,
legal advice. But what should a mediator do when a client insists that he or
she does not want-perhaps because he or she cannot afford or does not
see the relevance of-independent legal advice before making a decision
to settle? These provisions further assume not only that parties have ready
access to legal advice, but that this advice will be, or will be perceived to be,
relevant and practical to their bargaining choices. Where the law is difficult
to enforce, legal rights may seem a lot less relevant to the client than to the
lawyer. In the area of landlord-tenant law, examples of difficulties include
collection on a default judgment, the collection of tenant interest on rental
deposits,8" or where one party, for personal and practical reasons such as
avoiding a search for a new home or a new tenant, prefers peace to conflict.
Even where legal advice is provided, it may be overridden or
disregarded for reasons that appear to be contrary to that individual's best
interests. Can a person make an informed choice to disregard legal advice
when the decision appears detrimental to their interests? In a protracted
dispute, especially where a personal relationship between the parties exists,
what may appear to be an uninformed or even irrational choice may be
comprehensible in light of their relationship. In a case involving a personal
debt between a former couple, the debtor insisted that to demonstrate his
intent to pay off the debt, he would accept a punitive and illegal87 level of
interest on any failure or delay in paying an agreed installment. The
mediators spent a considerable period of time in private caucus canvassing
the issue of the penalty rate of interest but were repeatedly told that this
conformed to the party's wishes. He saw it as a symbol of his good faith in
making and keeping this agreement because he had breached a previous
verbal agreement and felt badly about it. Ironically, the agreement could
not be drafted according to his wishes. If such a provision had been
included, not only would this have rendered the whole agreement

85 "Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation", supra note 7,s. VIII (a). But it may
be difficult to draw this line. In Anthony's case, Joe's settlement offer had no legal disadvantages.
However, a judge would almost certainly have ordered eviction in the case of default, which would be
regarded as the final straw.
86 See Tenant ProtectionAct, supra note 80, s. 118(6).
87

Crininal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 347 which prohibits interest on loans above 60 per cent

per annum and makes charging more than 60 per cent interest, or assisting in drawing up a contract
to charge more than 60 per cent interest, an indictable offence. Both the person charging the rate of
interest and any individuals assisting in making such an agreement are liable.
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unenforceable, but the mediators themselves could have been charged
under the Criminal Code for facilitating it.
The exhortations of codes of conduct to simultaneously ensure
party self-determination and protect informed choice do not resolve these
real-life dilemmas for mediators. How can I make sense of my on-the-spot
decision in Anthony's case? Was it the right one? I continue to agonize
over this case primarily because responsiveness to parties' wishes is one of
my core mediation values. My immediate reaction to Anthony's situation
and my continued reflections on this case have brought this key value to the
surface, and have enabled me to understand this case as the exception that
proves the rule. This reflection makes me appreciate how strongly I believe
that the client in mediation-however apparently irrational in making a
settlement that appears not to be his or her logically best option-must be
provided the freedom to make his or her own decisions. This includes
disputes where a party has rejected the possibility of access to legal advice,
even after being offered free legal advice or other appropriate resources,
or has rejected the substantive advice itself. The only restriction I would
place on this is that the client must be able to respond to any concerns I
raise by describing a clear, self-conscious, and consistent reality-even if
that reality is quite different from my own. In making a discretionary
judgment about consistency and self-awareness, I do not claim to be valueneutral, but I do commit to recognizing the existence of many realities
other than my own. Mediation allows issues and priorities to be framed and
dignified within the social reality of each individual, unconstrained, unless
by choice, by rules of law or mainstream social norms. For this reason, I
resist routinely excluding individuals with mental health or developmental
disabilities from mediation, or those without legal representation oraccess
to legal advice. As a mediator, I should only override client wishes under
extreme and exceptional circumstances, such as apparent lack of capacity
to comprehend the consequences of an agreement. In the absence of any
clinical expertise, my intuitive benchmark is whether the reality described
and perceived by the client-whether or not it is the same as my own-is
described and perceived consistently, demonstrating to me that they are
clear about it. Anthony's case presented those exceptional circumstances
which required me to override his wishes. As important, however, is the
realization that I could not justify such a step where a consistently
expressed reality-shaped perhaps by a relationship history, a particular set
of needs and circumstances, or a particular set of expectations and
aspirations-means that a party regards a particular settlement offer as
acceptable, where I see downside risks.
From Anthony's case I also learned that while it is a matter of good
practice to anticipate questions of informed choice before they arise, and
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to encourage each participant in mediation to work with an external advisor
or supporter with whom he or she can discuss possible settlement decisions,
it is extremely difficult prior to the commencement of bargaining to predict
and control those factors which might be relevant to appraising selfdetermination and informed choice. These are so highly context dependent
that we underestimate their complexity and variability if we assume that a
complete assessment is possible in advance of mediation. Setting rules, such
as always requiring independent legal advice before mediation, may make
unfounded assumptions about the parties and their situation. This means
that the responsibility to behave ethically in order to maximize the potential
for both self-determination and informed choice requires more than
precautionary planning. Such assessments must also take place in the
moment and one-on-one at appropriate times during mediation, such as
when the parties are contemplating settlement.
VII. CASE TWO: THE DRUG DEAL
Don contacted me and asked if I could help resolve a loan dispute
he was having with Clive, a friend and former business partner. Don ran a
small credit operation. He said that he had lent Clive money for a business
venture which had failed. Don said he had been patient, but now wanted his
money back. He had commenced an action against Clive in Small Claims
Court. I contacted Clive who expressed great surprise that Don had sought
the intervention of a mediator. A mediation time and date was set for the
following week.
At the mediation, it transpired that the loan, using standard credit
documentation, was for an illegal drug deal. Clive was involved in a much
larger operation as a dealer for a consignment of cannabis which was being
imported into Canada. Clive had borrowed the money to finance his share
of the operation. Apart from supplying financing to Clive, and charging a
hefty rate of interest to be financed by the profits of the drug operation,
Don was not involved in the drug operation. Both parties agreed that
similar arrangements had been made between them several times before.
This time, however, the authorities had intercepted the shipment and the
operation had collapsed. Clive had already invested his money, and said
that he now had no means of repayment. Don reasoned that Clive had
taken an ordinary business risk and had failed; he now wanted the loan
repaid pursuant to the terms of the agreement. He had commenced a legal
action assuming that Clive would not incriminate himself in court by telling
the judge what the money was for. In mediation, however, the parties were
protected by confidentiality, and both were willing to be open about the
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nature and purpose of their transaction, either because the original
transaction was illegal, immoral, or both.
Both Don and Clive wanted to resolve this matter without involving
more people and before tempers worsened. They negotiated an agreement
in mediation which included a partial repayment schedule and some work
provided by Clive to Don; Clive was required to paint Don's offices. A few
months later, Don informed me that Clive had completed the agreed work
and that the payments were being made. I silently registered some alarm
at his apparent enthusiasm about the mediation process, presumably
reflecting my ambiguity over my decision to continue to work with the
parties once I became aware of the source of the conflict. I was also acutely
aware that other mediators might feel that I should have withdrawn as soon
as I became aware of the substance of the failed transaction.
References to illegal conduct or activities in codes of conduct are
limited to either exceptions to the duty of confidentiality or strictures
against allowing the mediation process to be used "to further 'illegal
conduct. '8 It is not clear how one would distinguish, in any particular case,
between the resolution of the issues in dispute, including the illegal
behaviour, and "furthering" the illegal activity itself.89 Another difficulty for
mediators is where to draw the line between thoroughly distasteful illegal
activities and those which are illegal but more socially accepted and
widespread. For example, a number of cases I have mediated involved a
measure of tax evasion in the organization of the financial affairs of one or
more parties. In one case involving a partnership dissolution, the disputing
partners had obviously colluded in the past to disguise actual revenues and
to reduce their tax burden. In another case involving several employment
disputes, it was clear that the employer was either not paying all the
required taxes and benefits, or income was not being declared by the
employees. It becomes difficult to distinguish between illegal activity in
excluding some cases from mediation, but not others. Perhaps a distinction
can be made between illegal activities that are the focus of the dispute
itself, as in the drug deal example, and related illegal activities on the part
of either one or both parties that come to light as the full story unfolds.
Illegal activity uncovered in the course of storytelling which is not part of

88 See "Code of Ethics (Minnesota)", supra note 7, s. V(5) which stipulates that under these
circumstances the mediator must withdraw. The same language is found in the "Comments" in
"SPIDR Code of Conduct", supra note 7, s. V1.
89 This may be also be relevant to ascertain the mediator's criminal liability, such as to assess
whether they are susceptible to a charge of criminal conspiracy under the Ciminal Code.
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the substance of the instant conflict between the parties might not be
considered to be the mediator's business. A further distinction might be
drawn between illegal activities that cause physical harm or endanger
others, and those that do not. However, none of the distinctions described
above between more or less socially acceptable illegal behaviours, illegality
that is incidental or central to the conflict, or behaviour that causes injury
or harm appears in any code of conduct. Aside from the general
admonition not to further illegal conduct, existing codes are silent on the
question of whether or not to become involved in the mediation of issues
arising out of illegal behaviour.
A different question is the issue of mediator liability. Could a
mediator who brokers an outcome to an illegal transaction be subject to a
charge of criminal conspiracy? When does a mediator have a responsibility
to report information disclosed in mediation? One of the possible
distinctions described above does appear in this context; most standard
terms of mediation make an exception to the mediator's undertaking of
confidentiality when they have learned about something that indicates a
threat to human safety.90 The SPIDR Code of Conduct goes further, stating
that the obligation of confidentiality is overridden where disclosure is
"required by law or other public policy"91 ; but this potentially allows for
wide discretion. It is not clear whether mediators are released from the
obligation of confidentiality where, in the absence of a positive requirement
or duty to report, they have become aware of illegal activity which they feel
should be reported to the relevant authorities; however, most codes of
conduct refer to the general obligation to hold information obtained during
mediation in the strictest confidence.92
Another possible basis for refusing or discontinuing mediation
services is the perceived immorality of the substance of the dispute,
whether or not it constitutes illegal activity. An individual mediator may

90 Below is an example of my own standard terms of mediation.
The mediator shall not disclose to anyone who is not a party to the mediation anything said
or any materials submitted to the mediators, except:
1. to the lawyers or other professionals retained on behalf of the parties or to non-parties
consented, as deemed appropriate or necessary by the mediator;
2. for research or education purposes, on an anonymous basis;
3. where ordered to do so by a judicial authority or where required to do so by law;
4. where the information suggests an actual or potential threat to human life or safety
91 "SPIDR Code of Conduct", supra note
7, s. V.
92 See e.g. "SPIDR Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility", supra note 7, s. 3, which
states "a] commitment by the neutral to hold information in confidence within the process also must
be honored."
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consider some activities and behaviours to be immoral that are constrained
by law. For example, common-law relationships may be morally offensive
to some mediators on religious or other grounds, making it difficult for
such individuals to assist a common-law couple in resolving their separation
details. Most mediators must adopt an arms-length approach to the moral
circumstances of any conflict in which they are asked to intervene.
However, some circumstances may raise moral questions for individual
mediators which erode their impartiality-for example, where the
behaviour of one party repulses the mediator such as in a case of admitted
sexual abuse or domestic violence. Some might further argue that offering
mediation to parties whose immoral behaviour has brought them into
conflict-a credible view of what transpired between Don and Clive-is
inappropriate. This is clearly a precipitous slope but just as clearly, a matter
of personal judgment.
A somewhat different perspective on the question of offering
mediation in questionable moral or legal circumstances is that such
intervention brings the profession into disrepute.9 3 Practically speaking, and
assuming that mediators conform to their undertakings regarding
confidentiality, the substance of private discussions is generally not in any
danger of being brought to the attention of either the profession or the
public. But regardless of whether such choices are ultimately public or
private ones, some mediators may feel bound to consider the impact of
their choices directly or indirectly on others in their professional
community, and on the reputation of the community as a whole. I am aware
that my decision to proceed in assisting Don and Clive to solve their
conflict may be subject to criticism on this basis.
I still feel that I made the appropriate decision in assisting Don and
Clive. My underlying values or theory-in-use-which also seems to fit other
disputes that I have mediated involving elements of illegality-emerges as
follows. First, I assume that individuals involved in drug deals can still
contract in good faith. I believe that the motivation to make and to keep a
bargain exists for all disputants regardless of their previous experiences
with conflict or the circumstances that bring them together. Individuals who
have behaved unlawfully or dishonestly in other situations may nonetheless
make a powerful personal compact in mediation.9 4 Second, I would draw

See e.g. "Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators", supra note 7, r. 10.600
which speak of the mediator's responsibility to "preserve the quality of the profession."
The same assumption runs through victim offender programs. See e.g. M.S.
Umbreit,
"Mediation of Victim Offender Conflict" [1988] J. Disp. Resol. 85.
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a clear distinction between cases in which illegal activity has already taken
place and directly or indirectly led to the conflict, and those in which the
parties wish to find an illegal or morally dishonest solution. The possibility
that the parties will propose illegal outcomes or solutions to their conflict
raises a different raft of ethical issues.95 In the case of Don and Clive, their
approach to dealing with the outstanding debt was lawful. 96 I routinely
inform parties that I will not participate in structuring outcomes which are
dishonest or may impact negatively on another person not present, whether
or not they are unlawful as such. In Don and Clive's case, where the illegal
activity had already occurred by the time I was asked to intervene, my
intervention did not condone or further the illegal drug trade, but rather
helped to resolve the consequences of an already broken agreement. By the
time I got involved, their conflict was already a reality, and my moral view
of their previous behaviour seemed irrelevant. The agreement Don and
Clive made in mediation did not enable them to continue with their illegal
activities-as with any parties, they may or may not choose to do so
regardless-since it did not complete or repair an existing arrangement to
buy or sell drugs. It dealt with the fall out of a failed transaction. At the
same time, I recognize that had I experienced a strong moral repugnance
to their earlier behaviour, for example if they had been involved in selling
child pornography or even had the drugs been identified as heroin or
cocaine instead of cannabis, I would probably have been unable to work
with them. But given the facts as told to me, I understood my task as
providing an opportunity for structured de-escalation rather than
moralizing about the circumstances that produced the conflict. The
potential for private, off-the-record discussions which may alleviate a
greater harm is a real strength of the mediation process. As a result of Don
and Clive's case, I am convinced that these types of ethical and personal
judgments can only be made on a case-by-case basis and I am skeptical
about the utility of distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable moral
or legal activities. This conclusion does raise, however, the question of how

95 Although even where the outcome is perfectly lawful, as it was in this case, there is the
additional question of whether a court would enforce such an agreement as contrary to public policy.
This did not seem to be a practical concern for either Don or Clive.
96 This is a far more common ethical problem and one which codes of conduct deal with only
tangentially. See e.g. "CDRC Standards of Practice for California Mediators", supra note 7, s. 3 which
states that a mediator should discontinue if he believes that "the integrity of the process has been
compromised"; "CBAO Model Code of Conduct", supra note 7, s. XI(3)(b) which stipulates that a
mediator should terminate the mediation if "one or more of the parties is using the process
inappropriately."
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to solicit feedback and input in order to ensure that personal moral
judgments are not made in a vacuum, without the benefit of supportive
scrutiny or hindsight.
As the dispute resolution community and the public continue to
debate the question of standards of practice and ethical conduct, my
colleagues in this field have a legitimate interest in my decision to offer
mediation services where illegal activity has taken place. I have chosen to
tell this story because I believe that any risk to my own reputation is more
than offset by the importance of such a debate. I have also reflected on how
I balanced my obligation to protect the integrity and reputation of the
profession with my responsibilities towards Don and Clive. My conclusion
is that my moral and professional responsibility to assist the parties in
resolving their dispute was a stronger moral imperative here than the
potential for my intervention to bring the profession or the mediation
process itself into disrepute.
This suggests that my judgment over when it is appropriate to offer
mediation is responsive first to client needs, and only secondly to the
concerns of those who seek to professionalize and promote mediation
services?7 Responsibility to the broader profession for ethical choices
implies a different kind of moral consideration than obligations to the
parties themselves; an assessment of the possible wider consequences for
the profession as a whole may even be incompatible with making clientcentred decisions over particular ethical decisions in individual cases.
Learning this lesson through reflection has implications for how I approach
the broader issues of the professionalization of conflict-resolution services,
as well as for my own practice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The analysis of my theory-in-use for the cases I have described
above suggests some principled basis for my choices. In the spirit of
reflective practice, the purpose of laying bare these values and assumptions
is not to suggest that they constitute the right answer to these dilemmas,
but rather to present some problematic decisions for further debate. The
case studies also serve to illustrate the inadequacy of the conceptual and
structural frameworks of codes of conduct. The ethical dilemmas presented
in these two cases are stark ones. A myriad of less obvious and recognizable

An interesting further question is whether this means that my theory-in-use
in this case is
consistent with or different from my theory-in-use for Anthony's case.
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ethical choices arise in every mediation. Recognizing that choices between
alternate courses of action in mediation are inherently value-based is
critical to the development of a professional culture of ethical behaviours;
regarding such decision making as technical, mundane, or merely intuitive
(and thereby neglecting to examine it) seriously underestimates the
complexity and nuance of decisions over interventions and their
responsiveness to context. Understanding ethical decision making in
mediation from this perspective places great store on the personal
discretion of the mediator, precisely the concern that was identified at the
start of this article.
The responsibility to mediate ethically goes well beyond that
assumed by codes of conduct, which are neither conceptually nor
structurally able to address the complex and unique moral dilemmas of
practice. In the absence of an established informal culture of good practice
to provide guidance for particularly challenging or unique situations, codes
are merely generalized, albeit worthy, sentiments into which mediators will
read their own version of moral relativism. They can do little to enhance
the informal moral culture of the profession or to challenge the wisdom
and professionalism of idiosyncratic individual approaches. In contrast, the
reflective-practice approach described in this article offers a paradigm for
both formalized professional development and personal self-study, but
conspicuously does not offer the comfort of right answers. Moreover,
putting the principles of reflective practice into practice requires the
conscious nurturing of a collaborative professional environment in which
personal experiences and choices are shared in a continuous, self-critical,
non-defensive, and open dialogue. It needs practitioners-new and old,
experienced and less experienced-to talk and write analytically and selfcritically about their approaches to ethical dilemmas. At a minimum, this
approach offers the field the potential of a credible democratic process for
engaging in discussion over ethical dilemmas with each other and with
clients.98 At best, a culture of reflective practice in which experiences are
made the subject of questioning analysis provides a microcosm for the
development of theory and perhaps ultimately a meta-narrative of ethical
behaviours.

98 Leda Cooks and Claudia Hale have argued that if mediators take over responsibility for
defining fairness and balance of procedure in mediation through the development of codes of conduct,
the disputants themselves are deprived of the right to frame the process in their own moral terms. See
Cooks & Hale, supra note 28. Client perceptions of fairness-particularly their feelings about
voluntariness, pressure and mediator judgement making-are critically significant for a field that
places such emphasis on client empowerment and self-made solutions.

